


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Views on INF Treaty

11181021 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English
25-31 Jan 88 p 21-22

["Forum" article by Wang Shuzhong: "After the Agreement on Medium-Range Missiles"]

[Text] [BEIJING REVIEW editor's note] This is the first "BEIJING REVIEW" forum. Forum will feature the private opinions and views of experts, scholars, and other readers on domestic matters, foreign relations, and international issues. We hope this column will enrich the content of our magazine. [end editor's note]

President of the United States Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev formally signed the agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) on December 8. If this agreement is carried out, it will be the first step towards nuclear disarmament. It is a welcome development. But I do not believe that the pact will have much effect on the strategic targets and the military situation of either side.

Reviewing past U.S.-Soviet negotiations on weapons, the two sides arrived at some agreements, but their nuclear arsenals have not been reduced. On the contrary, the number of nuclear weapons has risen, and this has resulted in both the disarmament negotiations and the arms race.

The U.S.-Soviet arms rivalry has constantly escalated and spilled over into outer space. To safeguard world peace, people make the reasonable demand that the United States and the Soviet Union share special responsibility for disarmament and take the first action to reduce substantially all kinds of nuclear weapons, including space weapons, and chemical, biological and large-scale destructive weapons, as well as conventional weapons.

The signing of the INF treaty proves that the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—needed to reach an agreement on disarmament favourable to both sides for economic and strategic reasons.

For decades the United States and the Soviet Union have conducted an unceasing arms race, at a heavy cost in terms of funds, manpower and materials. Their military expenditure has been so big that it has had a serious impact on their economies. The large financial deficits and huge debt of the U.S. Government have turned the United States from the world's biggest creditor to its biggest debtor. The U.S. Congress, with its Democrats'

majority, has put strong pressure on the Reagan administration to reduce arms and balance the budget. Similarly, the Soviet Union has been competing with the United States in the costly arms race for years, and this has led to stagnation in its national economy.

Under the circumstances, the Soviet Government has lowered the targets for national income and social labour productivity in its national economic development programme. As part of Gorbachev's "rethinking" of foreign policy, he introduced the concept of a reasonable number of weapons. The Soviet side hopes to slow the arms race to an appropriate pace and said that future weapons development will take place on the basis of a reasonable number of weapons, or enough for defence, without wearing down its economy in the arms race with the United States.

Strategically, the United States and the Soviet Union have fundamentally relied on mutual deterrence, that is, the two sides use the existence of retaliatory nuclear forces large enough to destroy each other as a means to maintain the strategic balance between them. This has led to the constant escalation of strategic nuclear forces that has gone on for decades.

Although each side's nuclear arsenal has attained over-kill capacity, no country can realize the aim of defeating its enemy in a future war. The result of such a war would only be mutual destruction. The key point is that the two sides are using the most advanced technology in the military sector in order to seize the military edge.

The requirements of military technology are stricter than ever before, especially if the two sides continue to pursue the outer space arms race, which has already started. With its superiority in sophisticated technology, the United States formally launched its Strategic Defence Initiative or "Star Wars" programme in 1983 so as to add a strategic defence system to its offensive system. If the defence system is a success, it will be deployed at the beginning of the next century.

In accordance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the Soviet Union has already deployed an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow. But this is inadequate to deal with the new U.S. challenge. The Soviets have made it clear that if the United States were to start the militarization of space and thus destroy the strategic balance, the Soviet Union would have no choice but to recover the balance through counter-measures.

The Soviet side has confirmed for the first time that it has been conducting strategic defence system research similar to that of the Americans. This proves that the strategies of both countries include a contest of comprehensive strength in the next century. Their military strategic thinking has moved away from the idea of having only offensive weapons and towards developing both offensive and defensive capabilities. Therefore, it is no wonder that the U.S.-Soviet arms race and disarmament negotiations are in a constant state of flux.

MALAYSIA

Prime Minister Views Nuclear Reduction

52004302 Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA in
Malay 12 Dec 87 p 5

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 11 December—Today Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir Mohamad said he was confident that the agreement to reduce the number of nuclear weapons made by the United States and the Soviet Union several days ago would have a good impact on the whole world and on these shores.

He said it would also allow the world to focus more on economic development.

In addition, he told reporters after inaugurating the "Movement for Loving Our Language" held here today, it would avoid wasting money on stocks of these weapons that are so expensive.

At the big powers summit conference held in Washington last Tuesday, Ronald Reagan, the U.S. President, and Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet president, sealed an agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles.

Meanwhile, the UMNO Pergerakan Pemuda [United Malays National Organization Youth Movement] welcomed the U.S. and Soviet Russian agreement, characterizing it as a positive sign toward world peace.

In this connection, the movement will send a note of appreciation to the embassies of the two countries for forwarding to their respective governments.

Datuk Sri Najib Tun Razak, deputy president of that movement, informed participants in a news conference held here, that it hoped the two big powers would diligently seek peace in the interests of the people of this world.

However, he said, "the UMNO Youth do not want the point of the meeting and the agreement to be merely a political masquerade for the two big powers or merely theater played out on paper."

6804/12232

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

GDR CDE Delegate Assesses Stockholm Document

08090623 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1358 GMT 8 Feb 88

[Text] Berlin, 8 Feb ADN—The document on the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) has been tried and tested in practice. Its adoption was a politically important achievement and an important step in efforts to reduce military confrontation in Europe. This was stressed by Ambassador Dr Guenter Buehring of the Foreign Affairs Ministry to GDR and foreign journalists in Berlin on Monday. Dr Buehring was the head of the GDR delegation to the CDE.

Ambassador Buehring stressed that all 35 CSCE participating states declared their determination to strictly adhere to the stipulations of the Stockholm document and apply them in good faith. In the GDR's view this could introduce a new element in international relations, which could counter a policy of tension and confrontation in Europe and introduce an ongoing process.

Ambassador Buehring referred to the need to continue negotiations on new or developed detente- and security-building measures and to introduce restrictions on large-scale military exercises. The latter could represent a bridge for real limitations on military potential from the Atlantic to the Urals and along the dividing line between the two alliances. A development of this nature would be of some importance in the present phase of breakthrough in East-West relations and of intervention by many states and many peace-loving forces for the continuation of the disarmament process.

It is important to establish a fund of trust that is capable of creating something practical and completely new, which can help to promote and encourage negotiations on conventional disarmament throughout Europe. This is served by the philosophy of the Stockholm document with its overall system of advance notification, the notification and observation of military exercises. Ambassador Buehring stressed that it was—even before the INF Treaty—the first international agreement to include on-site inspections.

GDR maneuver observers took part in nine maneuvers by the NATO states and five maneuvers in Warsaw Pact states in 1987. Foreign military observed three maneuvers on GDR territory. The GDR also allowed a British inspection on its territory and carried out an inspection in the FRG.

Ambassador Buehring described the exchange of observers as an important contribution to greater trust and predictability in the military sphere. This was also emphasized as positive by Western observers.

He said that the GDR conveyed its annual survey for 1988 punctually by 15 November 1987 to all CSCE member states. It gives advance notification of four troop exercises with more than 13,000 soldiers on GDR territory. In accordance with the Stockholm document, foreign observers will again be invited to three of these exercises with over 17,000 soldiers.

When the GDR annual surveys were conveyed, all the interlocutors from NATO and also neutral and non-aligned states welcomed the correct and punctual nature of the information and agreed with the GDR's view that the experiences in the translation into practice of the Stockholm document should be used constructively for the continuation of the CSCE process.

Physicians Issue Declaration Deploing Nuclear Testing

02181620 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 17 Feb 88 p 2

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—On Tuesday [16 February] the GDR section of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War published the following press declaration in Berlin:

For 18 months the Soviet Union kept a unilateral nuclear test moratorium. The world was relieved and hoped that the United States would join in halting nuclear tests. Unfortunately this did not happen. The desert of Nevada continues to be shaken by underground nuclear tests.

The tranquility in the Semipalatinsk test area gave way to new nuclear tests. Whether in the United States, the Soviet Union, or by France in the Pacific—the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War regard the thermonuclear tests as a threat to mankind. These tests may serve the development of even more terrible weapon systems.

We physicians, who have sworn on account of our profession to do everything in our power to preserve the health and lives of the people, appeal to the politicians in East and West, in North and South, to take mankind's yearning for peace into account. With concern and regret we had to take note of the nuclear tests in Semipalatinsk on 6 February and in Nevada on 15 February 1988. We are convinced that a competition between the Soviet Union and the United States in this disastrous area entails serious dangers. These tests have to be regarded as a violation of our medical prescription of a nuclear test freeze as a relevant step toward nuclear disarmament.

Withdrawals of 'Devilish' USSR SS-12s Called 'Advance Concession'

08181056 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0339 GMT 18 Feb 88

[Text] Berlin, 18 Feb (ADN)—Today's BERLINER ZEITUNG, in a commentary entitled "A New Advance Concession by the Soviet Union," writes that "the Soviet

missiles are more or less ready to leave Mecklenburg." "When they embark on the journey for home with their crews—as soon as the soldiers have completed their packing—it will be their final one. The devilish creation will be destroyed."

These SS-12 missiles are among the weapons included in the treaty on intermediate-range missiles signed in Washington. The treaty has not yet however been ratified. "In the Supreme Soviet and in the U.S. Senate the debate on this has only just begun. Their decisions are not realistically expected before April."

"That means," the paper adds, "that, in fact, no legally binding intermediate-range treaty yet exists. Despite this, the USSR is withdrawing its missiles. This is an advance concession, and not the first Soviet concession in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament. It is more than a gesture of goodwill, since the dismantling of these dangerous weapons is, for the moment, taking place in the face of an undiminished front of equally dangerous weapons. A risk is being taken here in the confidence that the other side will honor it. What more convincing evidence can there be of the unshakable desire of the USSR to free the world of the arms madness?"

HUNGARY

Envoy to Pact-NATO Talks Views Disproportions, Data

08151823 Budapest MTI in English
1730 GMT 15 Feb 88

[Text] Vienna, February 15 (MTI)—Monday in Vienna, delegations of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member states discussed issues of the talks to be held on the reduction of European conventional weapons and armed forces. The Hungarian representative noted that to eliminate the disproportions apparent in the European military relations it is indispensable for the sides to have coordinated data on the opposing forces. He called attention to the fact that in the practice of the existing arms restriction agreements, the national technical means and the international procedures based on many-sided cooperation are included, and the obligatory on-the-spot verification figures prominently coincides in this area, there is a possibility to word this section of the agreement as soon as possible, the Hungarian speaker noted.

Copenhagen Roundtable on Disarmament Talks End

06151855 Budapest MTI in English
1813 GMT 15 Feb 88

[Text] Copenhagen, February 15 (MTI)—Representatives of the Belgian (Flemish) Socialist Party, the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Danish Social Democratic

Party, the Dutch Labour Party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany held their 3rd round-table conference on Copenhagen February 12-14.

The press communique issued on the conference states among other things that the participants appreciated the historical importance of the Soviet-American agreement concluded on the elimination of the medium and shorter range missiles. They agreed that the signing of the agreement promotes the reduction of tension and the building of confidence. They took a stand for the immediate ratification of the agreement.

They pointed out that the dynamism of disarmament has to replace the dynamism of the arms race. They welcomed that the Soviet Union and the United States are to sign the agreement on the 50 per cent reduction of the strategic weapons in the first half of the year.

Participants stressed that the importance of the agreement should not be reduced by extending the arms race, or by deploying new weapons systems. Participants of the conference recalled that thousands of mass destructive nuclear missiles are still to remain on our continent. According to their standpoint the establishment of a central European nuclear weapon-free corridor is gaining increasing importance. The participating parties welcomed the efforts aimed at the creation of European nuclear weapon-free zones, including those in the northern area and the Balkans.

They were of the view that the establishment of chemical weapon-free zones would be the first step towards the total elimination of chemical weapons.

Participants stressed that a more secure Europe is inconceivable without the reduction of conventional forces and weapons. With respect to this participants proposed that the Vienna follow-up meeting discussing issues of European security and cooperation come to an agreement, without delay, on the talks referring to the reduction of armed forces and weapons found on the area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. Representatives of the participating parties assured their support to the talks to be held between the two military alliance systems on military doctrines.

The participants supported the conclusion of meaningful agreements in all areas formulated in the Helsinki Final Act, including economic, environmental protection, scientific, technical and humanitarian cooperation.

The representatives of the six parties also on this occasion stressed their common responsibility felt for the fate of Europe. They welcomed the initiative of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party and the Italian Socialist Party which encourages the cooperation of countries which do not possess

nuclear weapons, in the interest of European disarmament. The participants agreed to hold their next conference in the German Democratic Republic.

POLAND

Envoy Chairs CW Ban Committee at Geneva CD
12122252 Warsaw PAP in English
2145 GMT 12 Feb 88

[By PAP Correspondent Edward Dylawski]

[Text] Geneva, Feb. 12—A committee established for the current year by the Disarmament Conference of 40 states to draft a convention on the ban on chemical weapon and its destruction held its first meeting at the Geneva Palace of Nations here today. This year's debates of the committee will be chaired by Ambassador Bogumil Sujka who also leads the Polish delegation to the Disarmament Conference.

In his interview for PAP Bogumil Sujka assessed the role of the committee and tasks facing it this year.

It is of prime significance now so that the Soviet Union and the United States enter into a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, and that a convention on a total and universal ban on chemical weapon and its destruction be signed next, Ambassador Sujka said.

The fact that the United States has started a production of binary chemical weapons is the element that complicates the process of negotiations on the ban on chemical weapons. In such a situation the verification of obligations to liquidate chemical weapons produced now will be far more complex. It creates today a necessity to include mechanisms concerning the liquidation of weapons of this type in the future draft of the convention. This requires additional negotiations and extends the process of negotiations, Ambassador Sujka opined.

ROMANIA

Delegate Addresses Geneva CD Session
02162020 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
2045 GMT 16 Feb 88

[Text] Geneva (AGERPRES) 16/2/1988—Taking the floor during the proceedings of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Romania's representative outlined his country's stance, President Nicolae Ceausescu's outlook and initiatives, as well as the assessments contained in the documents of the National Conference of the RCP in connection with the imperative need to terminate the arms race, the nuclear arms race in particular, to eliminate all nuclear weapons and radically cut back on

conventional arms, to remove the war threat and ensure the people's foremost right to existence, to freedom, to independence, to life and peace.

In connection with the conference's working out a global disarmament programme it was pointed out that according to Romania a comprehensive disarmament programme should cover the following aspects: The cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles with a view to liquidating them in their entirety until the year 2000; the substantial reduction of conventional arms, of troops and military spending, by at least 50 percent until the year 2000; an agreement, struck between the states in the two military alliances, on ever lower ceilings on the major types of weapons. Measures were also suggested to freeze military spending and pass on to its reduction, the creation of nuclear- and chemical-weapons-free zones in various parts of the world, the withdrawal of all foreign troops to within their national borders and a firm pledge taken by every state not to deploy troops in the territory of other states, the dismantlement of all military bases in the territories of other states and the simultaneous dissolution of the two military alliances—the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty—the renunciation of military manoeuvres and shows in the vicinity of the national borders of other states. Emphasis was also placed on the need to ensure a strict and efficient control over the fulfilment of the duties the tasks assumed as concerns the achievement of real disarmament and the creation was suggested of an international body at the UN to control the application of disarmament measures. Furthermore, the importance was underscored of all states' taking a solemn pledge to give up the use and threat of force, to respect the independence of all peoples, their right to freely decided on their destinies, without any outside interference, to educate the peoples in the spirit of peace, against war and arming, as well as to enhance the UN role and responsibility in achieving disarmament.

The Romanian representative showed that after the conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, further, more important steps should be taken towards disarmament and the efforts of all states, of all negotiating forums should intensify for a phased-out elimination of all nuclear weapons, for the total cessation of nuclear tests and the renunciation of outer-space militarization, the substantial reduction of conventional arms, of troops and military spending, for a ban on chemical weapons and their elimination.

Stress was laid on the importance Romania attaches to a total ban and on the complete elimination of chemical weapons and, to that end, the elaboration by the Disarmament Conference of an international convention on the attainment of that target. He showed that Romania, as a country that does not possess chemical weapons, also stated for steps on a regional place to restrict the spread of this type of weapons.

General Staff Official on Prospects for INF Agreement

52001036 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 22, Nov 87 pp 91-95

[Article by Maj Gen Yu. Lebedev, deputy chief of the administration of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and A. Podberezkin, candidate of historical sciences, under the "Contemporary World: Problems, Tendencies and Contradictions" rubric: "Unique Chance for Europe and for the Entire Planet"]

[Text] Among the most important peaceful initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union in recent years, rightful mention is made of a complex of measures aimed at eliminating the nuclear missiles of the USSR and United States—medium range and operational-tactical (from 500 to 5,500 km)—on the entire planet.

It can be said without exaggeration that thanks to the efforts of the USSR a unique situation has arisen—for the first time in the entire history of the nuclear confrontation of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, it was possible to achieve fundamental agreement on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles. We would especially like to dwell on one of the positive consequences of the elimination of such nuclear arms. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev directed his attention especially to this in the article "Realities and Guarantees for a Secure World" published 17 September in PRAVDA: such an agreement would deliver a perceptible blow against the concepts of the limited use of nuclear weapons and the so-called "controlled escalation" of a nuclear conflict. It would eliminate the illusory "interim" versions and the strategic situation would become more stable.

Indeed, so much has been said in recent years (and certainly justifiably) about the danger evoked by the stationing of new American medium-range missiles in Europe and about the plans of the United States to be the first to use nuclear weapons in Europe and other regions. And here a serious blow has been struck against these intentions. But the significance of the agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles is not, of course, limited just to military strategic aspects.

There is also a political side of considerable importance, namely that the treaty on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles can provide the impetus for progress in other directions of curbing the arms race and above all it can become a good prelude for major—50-percent—reductions of strategic offensive arms and for an agreement with respect to the strengthening of the working of the ABM Treaty. With mutual striving, as M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his article, an agreement on this account could become a reality as early as the first half of next year.

In this way, the signing of a treaty on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles is an event of historic importance. It is a breach in the wall put up by the opponents of military detente and the curbing of the arms race throughout the world. The agreement reached in principle on the above-named classes of missiles has far-reaching political and military-strategic consequences. Is this not proof of the persuasiveness and validity of the concept of the establishment of a system of comprehensive international security based on the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the main points of the program for the elimination of nuclear arms pronounced on 15 January 1986!

At the same time, in speaking today of the real results of the tremendous efforts of the USSR aimed at achieving agreement on the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, it is essential to recall what our country has done on the way to this agreement and how the events developed in recent years. And this is necessary not only out of historical fairness. It is important to show how very difficult the struggle for a curbing of the arms race is and how consistent and persistent our country has been in this struggle, whose noble objectives correspond to the hopes of all humanity.

Out of the Impasse!

At the beginning of the 1980's, the problem of medium-range nuclear weapons (over 1,000 but less than 5,000 kilometers) became a central problem in the relations between East and West. It became especially acute with the December (1979) decision of the session of the NATO Council to station new American missiles in 5 countries of Western Europe beginning in 1983: 108 "Pershing-2" ballistic missiles and 464 "Tomahawk" cruise missiles. Their characteristics differed fundamentally from those of the existing systems of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the United States and NATO in Europe.

We recall that these arms are by no means the only ones at the disposition of the United States on the European continent. Besides the "Pershing-2's" and cruise missiles, the United States has so-called forward-based nuclear systems here. They include the nuclear-capable aircraft: FB-111, F-111, F-4, F-16 as well as the deck aircraft A-6, A-7 and F/A-18. Washington's NATO allies England and France also have significant nuclear potentials.

At the same time, it is important to stress that in the last decade in Great Britain and France the programs for the modernization of nuclear arms not only were not stopped but, on the contrary, were pushed.

During the entire time of the existence of nuclear weapons in Europe, the Soviet Union has persistently sought their reduction. As early as during the course of the negotiations on SALT I and SALT II, the USSR raised the question of the liberation of the continent from

medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons as well as that of the elimination of the forward-based systems of the United States from there. Our country later declared its willingness to examine this question during negotiations for SALT III. The USSR was ready to reduce its own medium-range missiles if there would be no additional new American medium-range nuclear systems stationed in Europe.

In December 1982, the Soviet Union declared its willingness to reduce on a mutual basis with the United States hundreds of missiles, maintaining only the number that England and France had. In so doing, with the reduction of English and French nuclear systems, the USSR would also reduce the corresponding number of its own nuclear arms of this class.

The Soviet proposals put forward in the declaration of M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 opened up even more possibilities in this area. They expressed, in particular, the willingness to come to an agreement on the question of medium-range missiles in Europe for the purpose of their complete elimination by the USSR and United States as the first step on the way to the general and total elimination of nuclear weapons on the European continent and in the world.

It is important to emphasize that the USSR was not simply declaring its willingness to destroy medium-range missiles but also supported this willingness in practice. Thus, in April 1985, the USSR unilaterally stopped the deployment of its own medium-range missiles along with the implementation of other countermeasures in Europe that it undertook after the beginning of the stationing of American medium-range missiles. The SS-20 missiles put in place after June 1984 were also removed from alert status and their number—243 units—has not increased since that time.

But what about the other side? The West, including England and France, has done everything to accelerate its own efforts aimed at arming the European continent with more and more dangerous and sophisticated nuclear weapons, including medium-range missiles, of which 412 have currently been deployed.

The importance of the major concession made by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik is especially obvious with the background of the acceleration of the nuclear preparations of the United States, France and England. Its essence is that our country agreed to eliminate completely the medium-range missiles of the USSR and United States, leaving the nuclear potentials of England and France "out of consideration." It was precisely in Reykjavik where we were able to find a formula mutually acceptable to the USSR and United States for a reduction to "zero" in Europe and to 100 medium-range warheads each for the USSR and United States stationed in the national territories outside of Europe. In practice, this meant that the USSR would have to reduce a

significant quantity of its medium-range missiles in Asia, whereas the United States would receive the right to deploy a certain quantity of such weapons in its own national territory.

This proposal, having, along with the initiatives on strategic offensive and space strike arms, a "package" (comprehensive) nature, reflected a kind of balance of the concessions and mutual interests of the USSR and United States achieved in Reykjavik. Soon after the meeting in the Icelandic capital, however, some Western politicians tried to use the "package" nature of the agreements as a pretext to disrupt the process of limiting the arms race. This is why on 28 February 1987 the USSR decided to separate the problem of medium-range missiles from the block of questions for the purpose of signing a separate agreement on it immediately.

In addition, our country gave its consent to the simultaneous elimination in Europe not only of medium-range missiles but also of operational-tactical missiles having a range of from 500 to 1,000 km. And in the summer of 1987, we declared our willingness to destroy both of these classes of nuclear missiles on a global basis. Thus, a few months after Reykjavik, the USSR took a new step of good will toward the West.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of such steps. They were aimed at getting the negotiations out of the impasse and ultimately at achieving the elimination of important types of nuclear weapons. It will be up to future historians to evaluate properly the scope and courage of the Soviet proposals.

The steps taken by the Soviet side in the negotiations on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles produced a turnabout in the approach to the holding of negotiations. What is its essence? The USSR proved in practice its adherence to the priority of political means over military and technical means of carrying on negotiations as well as to the priority of the principles of equal security of the sides.

It was precisely to such an approach by the Soviet Union to the holding of negotiations that M.S. Gorbachev directed his attention during a meeting with a group of teachers of the Russian language from the United States in August 1987: "...we proceed from the fact that if we consider only the interests of the Soviet Union and not the interests of our partner, then there will be no treaty. We appeal to the American side to do the same thing, to relate to us in the same way. For we will not allow superiority nor will we permit infringements of our security. And we do not want to impair the security of the United States. If both sides take such an approach, the most decisive progress in both directions of Soviet-American cooperation will be possible.

Obstacles on the Way to Agreements

It is precisely from the position of the consideration of the interests of the other side and all states on the planet that is possible to realize the idea of general security and, more precisely, the idea of the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security. And in this sense, a special role belongs to the negotiations on the reduction and elimination of nuclear arms. For they are the instrument with the help of which the world can and must be freed of nuclear weapons. To be deprived of this instrument or to turn it into an ineffective means is knowingly to doom the planet to a continuation of the nuclear arms race.

Therefore, in speaking today of the indisputably major historic achievement at the Soviet-American negotiations, we must for the sake of truth remember not only the efforts of the USSR aimed at eliminating medium-range and operational-tactical missiles but also what hindered and can hinder Soviet-American agreements.

As M.S. Gorbachev justifiably noted in his article that was designated abroad as the "doctrine of a secure world," many influential forces continue to adhere to obsolete ideas about the provision of national security. As a result, the world is in an absurd position, when they keep trying to convince it that the route to the abyss is the surest. Otherwise it is difficult to appreciate the point of view that nuclear weapons allow one to avoid nuclear war."

Let us recall that, in the process of negotiations on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, the United States and its allies step by step rejected their own proposals publicized over a number of years by Western propaganda. Such is the reality of history. It is necessary to remember this if only to refute once again the position of some Western mass media giving the American side the credit for making progress in the negotiations on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles.

Let us see what kind of a paradox results: in defending since 1981 the so-called "zero option," after Reykjavik and especially after the USSR separated the problem of medium-range missiles from the "package," Washington and its allies were forced to hurry and develop arguments essentially directed...against their own proposal! The invention of the subsequent trade-offs and obstacles was so artificial and the proposals of the USSR so dynamic and constructive in resolving them that Washington and the other capitals of the West European countries were not even able to substantiate their own reservations.

December 1986. At the session of the NATO Council, the countries participating in this alliance officially proclaimed their readiness "to support in full the question under consideration on the elimination of Soviet and American ground-launched medium-range weapons in Europe and their reduction to 100 warheads in Asia and

the United States, also considering that the ultimate objective remains the complete elimination of all such weapons." The Soviet Union sought to eliminate these obstacles but what about the NATO countries? They were not prepared for a constructive dialogue and a new "obstacle" appeared: the Soviet operational-tactical missiles.

The USSR put forth new proposals, the objective of which was to do away with this obstacle as well. It expressed, in particular, the willingness to write into the agreement on medium-range missiles the obligation of the Soviet Union to eliminate completely its operational-tactical missiles within a short time.

As everyone knows, the concentration of tactical nuclear weapons as well as conventional arms is high in Europe. In recent years, they have grown both quantitatively and as qualitatively. Taking this into account, the USSR and other member states of the Warsaw Pact proposed that all European states as well as the United States and Canada begin negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in combination with tactical nuclear weapons on a general European scale—from the Atlantic to the Urals. In other words, a broad program was outlined for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the European continent, the central link of which was the question of the destruction of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles.

The Political Side of the Negotiations

Such proposals objectively flowed from the sincere striving of the USSR and other socialist states to get the negotiations moving. No military-technical considerations and no short-term calculations could explain such a rapid movement forward in the peaceful offensive of the USSR. This is why one should dwell in more detail on the political side of the approach of the USSR to the negotiations on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles.

In the first place (and this is especially important to note after the problem of medium-range missiles was removed from the "package" and the operational-tactical missiles were made part of the negotiations), the Soviet Union and United States reached a qualitatively new level: the main obstacles on the way to the achievement of agreements were removed. For this reason, an especially acute question was that of not allowing the negotiations to get bogged down in the quagmire of secondary technical problems, trade-offs and stipulations. The political side—the reaching of an agreement—attained critical importance.

Such an approach is a specific manifestation of the new foreign-policy thinking, when specific actions must immediately follow pronounced principles. For one of the signs of the new thinking is the elimination of the gap between words and deeds. And under the existing conditions, it was extremely important to preserve the

dynamism in the resolution of issues in the negotiations and to anticipate the actions of the rightwing forces dreaming of drawing out the talks in Geneva to infinity.

Secondly, one can also speak of a certain overestimation of the nature of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons in Europe and in Asia. Previously as well, the USSR made the European direction of its policy a priority matter. Now, however, this accent has become even stronger. Europe is the "common house" for all the peoples of the continent. It is precisely here where interrelationships and interdependence, which are becoming more and more apparent in the world, are strongest. And it is precisely here where the most favorable conditions developed for the formation and consolidation of a system of international security. Finally, it is precisely here where the desire of peoples for the elimination of nuclear weapons is most perceptible.

Something else is important. The European continent became a place where military confrontation reached the highest level in the world. Here are concentrated the largest armed forces, equipped with the most up-to-date types and systems of weapons, which in their concentration exceed any region of the planet several times over. If even a conventional war were to be unleashed today in Europe, its consequences would be catastrophic for all peoples of this part of the world. And not only because "conventional" arms are now many magnitudes more destructive than what was used in World War II but also because its territory has about 200 reactor units at nuclear power stations and an extensive network of large chemical plants, the destruction of which would make the continent unsuitable for life.

For this reason, the removal of the threat hanging over our "common house" by physically eliminating two classes of nuclear arms has become a task of paramount importance and a first step that could discharge the atmosphere over our continent and essentially lower the level of military confrontation. If actually put into practice, this would be the first step on the way to the reduction of other arms in Europe and would give an impetus for progress in other directions of military detente.

Nor is there any doubt that the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range and operational-tactical missiles on a global scale corresponds to the security interests of the Asian countries as well.

Thirdly, it can be said that the problem of the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles has become the key to the resolution of other extremely important problems in the limitation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, including such problems as the prevention of the arms race in space. And this is understandable: for it is in the direction under consideration that the sides have made the most progress toward the signing of an agreement. Under current conditions, therefore, the resolution of the problem of a radical—by

half—reduction of strategic offensive arms and the strict observance of the working of the 1972 ABM Treaty as well as the limitation and banning of nuclear tests depend upon how rapidly a real agreement is achieved in the resolution of the problem of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles.

And here it is not a matter of some artificial linkage of the negotiations on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles with other negotiations. The very achievement of a political agreement that would result in the physical destruction of nuclear missiles (an unprecedented event in world practice) would be a brilliant example of the possibility of reaching agreements in other areas as well and, in the final analysis, of showing the workability of the program for ridding the world of nuclear weapons put forth in the declaration by M.S. Gorbachev in January 1986.

In this way, the problem of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles has actually become the link that by tackling one can hope to unravel a whole series of problems in nuclear disarmament. This was confirmed by the meeting of USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz and the U.S. President held in September of this year. At the meeting, as you know, it was possible not only to resolve in principle the question of an agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles but also to achieve progress in other areas.

In particular, they examined issues linked with the limitation and reduction of nuclear and conventional arms and chemical weapons and they discussed questions involving nuclear tests (agreement was reached, for example, on the start of full-scale staged negotiations on the issue under consideration by 1 December 1987). They also discussed regional problems and the broad spectrum of relations between the USSR and the United States.

In other words, the level of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States was raised considerably largely because of the new approach of the USSR to the resolution of the problems with medium-range and operational-technical missiles.

Maneuvering of Aggressive Circles

The bold steps by the Soviet Union toward the West on the issue of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles are receiving the most positive response around the world. To a considerable extent, they help to erode the myth about the "Soviet military threat" and undermine the positions of those reactionary circles in the West that over the course of decades have persistently creating an "enemy image" out of the USSR.

For four decades in the West, they have been talking out our supposed military superiority and frightening peoples with a "Soviet threat." This is the justification for

the increase in the NATO nuclear arsenals, the escalation of the militaristic activities of aggressive military blocs, and the kindling of an anti-Soviet psychosis.

The question has now been raised point-blank: how long will all this last? Our position is clear and distinct: do not trust us—tell us specifically what your concerns are. Let us examine the issues and remove suspicions. Together we will decide what is a “reasonable sufficiency” for defense. We are prepared to resolve all the questions that arise, to resolve them together, honestly and openly.

The reality of the signing of an agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles also gives a powerful impetus to the antiwar struggle, which has become especially active in recent years. The proponents of peace in the West are seeing with their own eyes that the efforts expended can lead to a positive effect. All of this, we repeat, binds the hands of the most aggressive circles of the United States and NATO, narrows the range for their political maneuvering, and literally forces them to give up their most dangerous plans.

Without a doubt, the moral and political effect of the agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles is enormous. It proves above all that the establishment of a nuclear-free world and a general system of international security is not a utopia but a specific prospect opening up for humanity.

It is clear that such a turn of events has never suited and today does not suit the most aggressive circles of the United States and NATO, who have not renounced attempts to achieve military superiority by way of an increase in the qualitative, or “technological” arms race. Today they are trying to push the implementation of military programs in the realm of the creation of space strike arms and other systems and types of weapons. They are also preparing to circumvent the apparent agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. In particular, they are planning to deploy new weapons armed with nonnuclear warheads and to deploy systems in the countries of Western Europe that could “compensate” for the loss of medium-range missiles.

No less dangerous are the plans being discussed in some places for the additional deployment of American nuclear systems—aircraft and cruise missiles—in the countries of Western Europe or the surrounding water areas. As M.S. Gorbachev justly stressed in a speech in Murmansk, we cannot fail to be concerned about reports that, in the event of an agreement on the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, NATO is preparing to utilize sea and air-based cruise missiles from the North Atlantic.

In fact, on examination this turns out to be nothing other than attempts to have them replace ground-launched “Pershings” and cruise missiles! It is noteworthy that as soon as the agreement in principle on the “double zero”

started to become a reality, forces in the United States and NATO in favor of the increase in the nuclear and nonnuclear arms races in Europe were activated.

The plans for the actual circumvention of the impending agreement are evidence that in Washington and other NATO capitals they are continuing to count on the resolution of international issues by military force. This is why the skillful combination of the bold and large-scale initiatives aimed at limiting the arms race with the search for mutually acceptable agreements is especially important today.

The negotiations between the minister of foreign affairs of the USSR and the U.S. secretary of state on the 22nd and 23rd of October 1987 in Moscow took place precisely in this direction. In the course of those talks, they essentially worked out the basic positions of the agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. It was possible to overcome some obstacles that arose in Geneva. In particular, they found a final formulation for the position on the “Pershing-1A’s” and agreed on the timing for the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles and the procedures for their destruction. They also made good progress in resolving questions in verification. It can be said that the Moscow meeting greatly accelerated the signing of an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The experience in negotiations with the United States has shown that the USSR is seriously interested in a change for the better in relations with the American side and that in socialist society, as never before, there is a growing interest in the improvement of relations with capitalist countries in all areas. But, as M.S. Gorbachev justifiably pointed out in the course of his meeting with G. Shultz, it is time not only for Soviet but also for American bulldozers to clear the way to one another. This is the urgent requirement of the day. And a maximum of attentiveness and mutual understanding is required from both sides so as not to miss the opportunity that was already missed once.

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Japan's Attitude Toward Disarmament Assessed *Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Dec 87 p 4*

[Article by I. Latyshev: “The Time to Choose Has Come”]

[Text] The response in the Japanese political world to the Soviet-American summit meeting has been exceptionally great. In the opinion of Japanese society it was the main event of the past year. Readiness to seek ways to eliminate the threat of nuclear catastrophe, displayed during the visit by M. S. Gorbachev to Washington, not only by

the Soviet side, but also by a number of prominent American state officials, confirmed the reality of the tasks of restructuring international relations on the basis of new thinking.

In the stream of responses to the results of the negotiations that were held and the signing of the treaty on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles, the Japanese view and comprehend from different sides the role of Japan itself in efforts to eliminate the nuclear missile opposition of the two camps. This is understandable. The gigantic industrial and financial potential of Japan is capable of having great influence not only on the situation in the world economy, but also on the development of international life in our day. Under these circumstances the responsibility of the Japanese leaders for the political decisions they make is today higher than ever before. Should Japan join the efforts aimed at disarmament? This is not only a matter of her domestic politics, but is also a serious international question. In order to illuminate it, your correspondent met with a number of prominent political figures representing influential forces on the Japanese scene. For example, statements by the chairman of the Socialist Party TsIK [Central Executive Committee], Takaka Doi and Dzyunya Yano, Komeito Party TsIK chairman indicate the frames of mind of the leaders of the parliamentary opposition in connection with the Soviet-American summit meeting.

We welcome and greatly appreciate the tremendous efforts and political wisdom of the leaders of the Soviet Union and the U. S., who signed the treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles, stated Doi. The agreement opens a new era in world history, the era of transition from the arms race to disarmament, from tension to detente, and from war to peace. A turning point is taking place in the life of mankind. Let 1987 become the year of the beginning of the destruction of nuclear weapons.

Now, she continued, the question of a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons is placed on the agenda. There still remain unresolved issues associated with sea and air-based nuclear weapons. It would be desirable for the Soviet Union and the U. S. also to make efforts toward the most rapid possible elimination of these types of weapons as well, including in the Asiatic-Pacific Ocean region. We think it is important to convene an international conference on disarmament with the participation of all the nuclear powers. This is necessary for the complete destruction of nuclear weapons on our planet. As concerns Japan, it cannot be assumed that she will take a wait and see position on this question. Observing three non-nuclear principles, Japan must put an end to visits to her ports by ships carrying nuclear weapons, prohibit the placing of F-16 aircraft at Misawa base, and refuse to provide technical assistance to the SOI [SDI — Space Defense Initiative] program, and take specific steps in the direction of disarmament. It is necessary, in particular, to place the relations between

Japan and the Soviet Union on a firm foundation of peace and friendship. These relations must become an important factor in strengthening peace and detente in Asia.

Here is Yano's opinion: The treaty signed by General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan is a great, epoch-making event. Whereas before the development of Soviet-American relations was in a vicious circle, now the opportunity has come to develop these relations along the path of strengthening mutual trust.

Of course, much still remains to be done. We would like, for example, for the Soviet-American negotiations to encompass not only a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, but to go even further. We would like for an agreement to be achieved on reducing conventional weapons. I believe that Japan can play an important role in assisting the Soviet-American understanding. Unfortunately, our government is continuing to increase military expenditures, which have exceeded one percent of its gross national product. In absolute terms these expenditures comprise a very significant sum. And the high level of Japanese technology enables Japan to produce the latest types of modern weapons, despite the fact that this contradicts the constitution. Moreover, in the light of today's Soviet-American negotiations, the buildup of Japanese weapons looks like an anachronism. This policy can lead only to exacerbating international tension.

The Japanese Communist Party also comments positively on the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting. In so doing the JCP [Japanese Communist Party] leadership accentuates its main attention on the task of further struggle against the enemies of nuclear disarmament, and on problems associated with the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Thus, in a conversation with me, Khiromu Murakami, chairman, JCP Central Committee Presidium, recalled the joint statement by the CPSU and JCP, and the talks in December 1984 at which the common goals of both parties in the struggle to prevent nuclear war and eliminate nuclear weapons were proclaimed. Having given a high assessment to the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, as well as to the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting, the JCP Central Committee Presidium chairman at the same time directed attention to the presence in the world of powerful forces that still cling to nuclear weapons. In Europe these forces, in his words, include the NATO leaders, who adhere to the concept of "nuclear deterrence," and already now proclaim their unwillingness to reduce strategic nuclear weapons by more than 50 percent. My co-discussant further noted the absence of intentions on the part of Washington to eliminate the nuclear weapons that are deployed in the area of the Japanese islands, on American warships and submarines, and are based in Japanese territorial waters or visit her ports.

Continuing this thought, he stated: "The JCP struggles resolutely to eliminate the Japanese-American security treaty, in accordance with which Japan is turned into a forward base of American nuclear strategy." The party favors the creation of a "non-nuclear government" in Japan. The JCP ascribes great importance to implementation of the slogan, "creation of an international anti-nuclear front," which was put forth in the documents of the recently held 18th Party Congress.

How does the leadership of the ruling liberal democratic party assess the results of the Soviet-American negotiations? One of the leading figures of the conservative camp, Mitio Vatanabe, chairman of the council for the study of political questions of the LPD [Liberal Democratic Party], who is currently in charge of the development of the political strategy of the ruling party, set forth for us its position.

We are glad, stated Vatanabe, for the signing of the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles. We also hope for success of the subsequent negotiations of the two countries on reducing strategic weapons. We favor the ultimate destruction of all nuclear weapons existing on earth.

However, subsequent statements by our influential co-discussant contained reservations, which could not help but prick up one's ears. For example, he believes that despite this Japan should continue to arm. And he argues it in this way. Whereas Japan is superior to France, Great Britain and the FRG in economic potential, it still lags behind them in the level of its defense potential. Therefore, he said, it should raise this level.

The views of Mr. Vatanabe represent the quintessential position of the ruling liberal democratic party on this question. And the meaning of recent statements by the party chairman, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, boil down to the fact that Japan should not refrain from increasing her military expenditures or from a further buildup of the military might of the Japanese armed forces.

The impression is created that detente does not very much answer the interests of influential groupings in the Japanese ruling camp. The "Cold War" enabled the monopolies, such as Mitsubishi Dzyukoge, who are associated with weapons production, to warm their hands on government military orders. And such extremely right-wing politicians as Nakasone exploited the concoctions about the "military threat" supposedly created by the Soviet Union, in order to justify increasing military expenditures and building up the Japanese military potential. And it is no accident that the conclusion of the treaty eliminating intermediate and shorter range missiles between the USSR and the U. S. bewildered these circles.

Attempts to subordinate Japanese policy to self-interested calculations of individual groupings of its ruling camp are fraught with serious harm, not only to the national interests of the Japanese people, but also to the cause of normalization of international relations as a whole. Peace-loving Japanese society demands that the Tokyo ruling circles listen to the voice of reason and make adjustments in its foreign policy in the spirit of the Soviet-American summit meeting.

9069

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

USSR Urges Support on Arctic Demilitarization *08172141 Montreal International Service in English* *2100 GMT 17 Feb 88*

[Text] The Soviet Union is urging Canada to support the Kremlin's latest proposal on reduced military activity in the Arctic among northern nations. Moscow has made the appeal calling it a step towards global arms reductions. The appeal is also aimed at Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland and the United States. It's an extension of a proposal for northern security made by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev last October. A Soviet Embassy spokesman in Ottawa (Aleksey Makharov) says the Kremlin is serious about the demilitarization of the Arctic and hopes for a positive response from the Canadian Government. Mr (Makharov) also says that Ottawa should scrap its planned purchase of up to 12 nuclear powered submarines. He says Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic can be achieved through peaceful means. Canada wants the vessels to protect northern waters from possible intruders.

Last week Canadian Defense Minister Perrin Beatty said the Kremlin's proposal is unacceptable if it does not specifically include the Soviet military installation on the Kola Peninsula. Mr Beatty says Ottawa cannot make a move until Moscow is prepared to reciprocate. The Kola Peninsula southeast of Murmansk contains the largest single concentration of Soviet military activity including the home base for the Soviet northern fleet.

AUSTRIA

Vranitzky on INF Treaty, Conventional Arms *52002441 Vienna NEUE AZ in German 21 Dec 87 p 5*

[Article by Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky: "No Conventional Arms Buildup Now"]

[Text] The INF treaty that was signed on 8 December in Washington by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons, i.e. land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles with a range of 500-5,500 km, the majority of which are stationed in Europe and aimed at European targets.

We are therefore justified in speaking of a change in direction from decades-long arms control discussions—with few exceptions fruitless—to a disarmament agreement which genuinely lowers the available weapons potentials. Until a short time ago, anyone who had imagined such a development in this heavily armed Europe of ours, of all places, would probably have been dismissed as a dreamer. In my view, then, the responsibility of those who will have to be in charge of the domestic conversion and the international fulfilment of

this agreement is all the greater. History has taught us that the mere concluding of treaties in itself does not bring about any effective, reliable and lasting changes in existing conditions.

We are encouraged in our hope for a rapid application of the treaty by those treaty stipulations which should probably also be viewed as a "new dimension." The comprehensive verification mechanisms, which can really be described as radical in their range, and which sometimes even exceed the actual object of the treaty, would have been unimaginable even in the detente era of the seventies. But it does not take much imagination to picture what as yet unforeseen difficulties the treaty partners will have to content with in order to apply these new stipulations, which are quite new for both sides, in accordance with the treaty. And in our view all those who sit as observers at the superpowers' roulette table are also being challenged to agree, in a kind of fundamental world-wide consensus, that the new dimensions embodied in the new INF agreement have global significance for the peace and security of mankind in a world with fewer weapons.

In Austria we have always assumed that even the best, most innovative and confidence-inspiring measures will have little effect if they are not subject to verification. It is precisely the rigorous verification mechanisms of the new agreement that can help to counter this danger, the danger of an unfounded and empty trust, and to create the kind of trust between the superpowers that will be essential for agreement on future steps towards disarmament. Leading U.S. and Soviet politicians have declared that they next wish to try to obtain an agreement about reductions in strategic arms. In spite of current optimism, agreements in this area will only be achieved if the barriers of mutual distrust are broken down further and a basis for trust is achieved through compliance with existing treaties. The control regulations which have been agreed upon might be an important milestone on this road.

In any case, I consider that the INF agreement has historic dimensions, seen against the background of the relations between the two superpowers and with regard to its effect on the international political situation. On the other hand, it is of course necessary to take into account the considerations and misgivings which tend to derive significant disadvantages in security policy for Europe from the treaty. It is even argued that mutual reduction of one arms category will disturb the balance or even significantly worsen Western Europe's security status.

The oppressive superiority of the East in the conventional category relative to comparable forces on the Western side, whether real or imagined, is a factor in the discussion. Even though I do not intend to get into numbers games or comparison of military forces, I should draw attention to serious, fact-based analyses of this topic. Documents like the East-West comparison of

conventional forces recently issued by the defense committee of the WEU, the annual analyses of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, or the "net assessment" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. military, which was made public only a few days ago, should certainly be cited.

Oddly, in the public debate on security policy they are often ignored or almost nervously guarded from excessive publicity. The mutual evaluation of these positions and the resultant reservations about reservations to the INF agreement ought not to call into question the duty of self-defense, the duty of sober watchfulness. But here too we should be realistic about keeping a sense of proportion, and concern ourselves with how we might increase security through disarmament instead of increased armament.

In any case, I would like to warn against undermining the disarmament success achieved in intermediate-range forces by a new arms buildup in conventional forces. The new dimension in East-West relations and in the area of disarmament which has now been achieved would then be endangered by a new dimension of increased armament.

09337

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Chancellor Kohl Leaves for Talks in Washington
08171308 Hamburg DPA in German 1240 GMT
17 Feb 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Chancellor Helmut Kohl left by air for Washington today for 3 days of consultations. Accompanied by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Kohl plans to discuss security and finance questions with President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz, and Treasury Secretary James Baker.

Talks with representatives of Congress will be a top priority. Kohl and Genscher want to make clear the pressing German interest in a speedy ratification of the INF Treaty. The two German politicians also want to expound the German standpoint in other disarmament areas, from chemical weapons to short-range missiles, and to discuss East-West relations.

Press Comments on Kohl's Washington Trip
17181055 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 18 Feb 88

[From the Press Review]

[Text] One of the topics discussed by the press today is Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to Washington.

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG says: He usually enjoys being in Washington. He was always totally in agreement with his friend Ron. However, this time there are problems. Following the superpower agreement on the reduction of their land-based intermediate-range missiles, differences have come to light. Regarding the next step—the reduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles—Bonn and Washington are in agreement. But after that? The Germans insist on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons and consider an agreement before the end of this year possible. However, the Americans are already putting on the brakes. Their delegation in Geneva has not been receiving any negotiating instructions, and General John Galvin, who has been SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] since last year, expressly advocates chemical weapons. In addition, the Germans insist on an overall NATO concept for further arms control before they are ready to decide on the modernization of the remaining nuclear weapons. Neither Bonn nor Washington should be interested in an open controversy. After all, the NATO summit meeting is coming up, and partners intend to demonstrate agreement.

PASSAUER NEUE PRESSE stresses: The federal chancellor will be having a hard time in Washington, because in view of the agreement on scrapping intermediate-range weapons, Bonn now is not totally willing to accept the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons as agreed to by the Western alliance. However, Bonn's allies, led by the United States, stress that the renunciation of modernization in practice would be tantamount to a renunciation of such short-range weapons. If the systems are not modernized there will be a third zero solution—through rusting away whether we like it or not. However, the federal chancellor does not at present consider it necessary to act. Bonn wants a coherent disarmament concept in which in particular the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority and the renunciation of chemical weapons would have to be negotiated. The fact that U.S. President Reagan's term of office is ending and time is pressing as a result, as well as the fact that Kohl is being pressured to succeed, do not make the chancellor's mission any easier.

The Bonn daily GENERAL-ANZEIGER comments: Bonn's request for an overall concept defining the objectives of arms control in all areas regarding lastingly assured defense and vice versa is well founded. Too much time has been wasted—and German politicians also bear part of the responsibility—with useless controversy and absurd suspicions. The issues are the denuclearization of Europe, the third zero option, and the modernization of short-range missiles. However, there is no denuclearization automatism. As against the second zero solution, which was based on Moscow's unilateral voluntary decision, NATO has its own potential with ranges of less than 500 km—88 reloadable Lance systems and about 600 missiles. No one can force it to accept a zero solution or—in the case of the East-West agreement on equal upper limits—renounce modernization.

Kohl on Disarmament

Kohl 'Satisfied' With Washington Talks

08201405 Hamburg DPA in German 1247 GMT
20 Feb 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl returned to the Federal Republic on Saturday satisfied with the successful course of his consultations in Washington. In a television interview, the chancellor stated that he is "happy" about gaining U.S. support for the German intentions in disarmament policy.

Kohl, who was accompanied by Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was able to persuade the U.S. Administration to view the contentious modernization of the nuclear short-range missiles in a very long-term way and as part of an overall NATO concept. In Washington, Kohl also announced a deepening of German-U.S. relations through the expansion of exchanges.

Federal Foreign Minister Genscher (FDP) believes that confidence in cooperation between the European and U.S. allies has been strengthened. In an interview on Hesse radio on Saturday Genscher stressed that there is more confidence in U.S. policy.

Genscher said the U.S. side understands it is sensible to work toward an overall concept for disarmament steps. U.S. President Ronald Reagan can count on his policy of disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union and thus also his efforts for a 50-percent reduction in strategic potentials meeting with the support of his European and Canadian allies. Genscher still hopes for the conclusion of a treaty on limiting intercontinental missiles (START) this year.

Conventional Disarmament Needed

08211300 Hamburg DPA in German
1216 GMT 21 Feb 88

[Excerpts] Hamburg (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, following his return from talks with the Washington administration, has noted with a view to the further process of disarmament and arms control the need for disarmament primarily in the conventional sector. Kohl stated in the paper WELT AM SONNTAG that Washington had a deep understanding for the Federal Government's idea to continue the disarmament process within the framework of a NATO general concept. The chancellor alluded to the NATO summit in Brussels in early March where, after the accord on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, further forward-looking resolutions must be adopted. Kohl said: "In particular, the Soviet Union must be taken at its word regarding disarmament in the conventional area since it has an immense superiority here over the West." [passage omitted]

Lothar Ruehl, secretary of state at the Federal Defense Ministry, in an article published in WELT AM SONNTAG, emphatically rejected the further reduction of nuclear defense capability in West Europe. The reduction of the European nuclear weapon stocks shifts the invasion capability of the Warsaw Pact—with conventionally armed, highly mobile and attack efficient ground and air forces—into the center of all the considerations concerning military security. In case of attack the Warsaw Pact could turn up within 20 days with 124 divisions in the Central/West European Theater of operations. In contrast NATO needs 14 days to raise a mere 36 divisions. To overcome this superiority is the main task of further disarmament control negotiations. [passage omitted]

Defense Ministry Assesses Pact Invasion Capability

17211501 Hamburg DPA in German
1145 GMT 21 Feb 88

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—High-ranking Bundeswehr officers have advised a cautious and sober approach to the continuous new versions of the Moscow disarmament offensive. [passage omitted]

The Federal Defense Ministry states unmistakably in a new paper on the "Invasion Capability of the Warsaw Pact" that the treaty on eliminating intermediate-range missiles has not solved Europe's security problem, but has shown even more sharply the problems in the conventional sphere. The more nuclear weapons that are withdrawn from Europe, the greater the weight attached to the conventional superiority of the Soviet Union and the East Bloc.

The security problem of the Western Europeans lies in Soviet military might and its strategic potential. "With its military might several times superior to that of NATO, the Soviet Union has the capability to invade central Europe," the Defense Ministry brochure says. With their forces, the Soviets could force a quick military decision on Federal Republic territory and "occupy the conquered area."

The Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority over NATO in central Europe emerges, according to the Bundeswehr, as follows: 1:2.4 in tanks; 1:3.1 in artillery; 1:2.1 in armored personnel carriers; 1:2.4 in combat helicopters; and 1:1.6 in combat aircraft. The East is particularly capable of "fighting in depth," because of the number of strategic-operational airborne units (two Soviet airborne divisions in the Baltic and one Polish airborne brigade, and seven more Soviet airborne divisions in the USSR) and the far-reaching firepower of its mechanized combined services units. [passage omitted]

Genscher Views Disarmament, NATO

17212056 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German
1810 GMT 21 Feb 88

[Interview With Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by reporter Peter Ellgaard; on the "Bonn Direkt" program; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] Mr Minister, even critics recognize the Federal Government's success in Washington. However, how long will that harmony between Bonn and Washington last? As a matter of fact, the decisions on modernization have only been postponed.

[Genscher] We want a global security concept which includes not only the disarmament problems—which have been largely discussed in the Reykjavik foreign ministers' communique—but also what is necessary for defense whether or not our disarmament concept is successful. In this respect, isolated decisions would be completely out of place. We do agree with the Americans on that. We also agree with them that an important impetus must emerge from the NATO summit meeting in Brussels regarding conventional negotiations, and negotiations on conventional stability in Europe.

[Ellgaard] What will the Federal Government's position be in Brussels? The global concept will be put to the test there for the first time.

[Genscher] Well, we will have to discuss the elements of the concept there, and—in agreement with the Americans—we will attach particular importance to ensuring that negotiations on conventional stability in Europe can finally start. After all, the crucial problem of European security lies in the East's conventional superiority; thus, it must be our goal to reduce that superiority. The East is ready not just for negotiations, but also to reach a negotiated agreement on reducing its superiority. However, conventional stability is more than balance expressed in figures. It is important for the armed forces on both sides to be organized in the future according to arms, equipment, deployment, and degree of readiness in such a way that they would be capable only of self-defense, not a surprise attack or operations to seize territory in the other side's area. In this respect, we agree in principle with our Western allies. In addition, the East has presented its concept. What matters now is to discuss all those positions step by step at the negotiating table to achieve true stability and to secure peace by an inability to attack [nichtangriffsfaehigkeit] on both sides—which already holds true for our country to a high degree.

UNITED KINGDOM

Thatcher Urges NATO Nuclear Modernization
08172044 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English
1956 GMT 17 Feb 88

[by Geoff Meade, PRESS ASSOCIATION staff reporter in Brussels]

[Text] Mrs Thatcher today set the tone for a tough battle of wills within NATO over weapons modernisation and nuclear arsenal cutbacks.

The prime minister used her first official visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels to urge for a powerful deterrent in the face of a Soviet Union which, she said, would like nothing better than to split the alliance.

Mrs Thatcher's uncompromising declaration comes as a precursor to the NATO summit in the city on March 2 and 3, which will be attended by President Reagan.

The prime minister is concerned over West German-led reluctance to modernise NATO's weaponry and keenness to open Warsaw Pact negotiations to cut short-range nuclear missiles—moves certain to disillusion Washington at a time when NATO needs all the solidarity it can get, she warned.

"We ignore at our peril the fact that Soviet policies abroad remain a serious threat," said Mrs Thatcher.

"Their central objectives are to separate Western Europe from the U.S., to dissolve NATO unity and lower allied defenses. A de-nuclearised Europe would admirably serve their purposes," she told a press conference after talks with NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington and Britain's NATO Ambassador Mr Michael Alexander.

She claimed the Soviets were employing a "carefully cultivated image of reasonableness" with the West.

NATO's response had to be the maintenance of strong defenses, conventional and nuclear, at an adequate level of spending.

"We must ensure that we continue to have a technological edge over the Warsaw Pact. Keeping ahead is itself a powerful deterrent," she said.

She emphasized the need for a "credible" weapon mix: "I regard dreams of a nuclear-free world as just that—dreams. You cannot disinvent a nuclear world." "There is in my view no case for negotiation further to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe before substantial reductions in chemical and conventional weapons have been achieved."

She said it would be "totally and utterly absurd" to separate the modernisation of conventional weapons from nuclear weapons.

She dismissed suggestions that modernisation should be abandoned by emphasising NATO's duty to uphold peace and freedom: "Of course you modernise aircraft, tanks, weaponry, guns and nuclear weapons.

"You don't deter with obsolete weapons. You don't as prime minister, or as the Alliance, put your troops in the field knowing their weaponry is less good than that they face. Modernisation is part of deterrence and defence."

The "crying need" on arms control now, she went on, was to negotiate on conventional and chemical weapons: "Perhaps when we have successfully negotiated that, we can get back to nuclear weapons."

Mrs Thatcher was not totally antagonistic towards the Soviet Union and there was much to welcome in what Mr Gorbachev was trying to do. "The more he succeeds domestically the greater the sum total of human freedom," she said.

Thatcher, Gerasimov on Nuclear Free Europe
08182222 London Press Association in English
2144 GMT 18 Feb 88

[By Michael Prescott, PRESS ASSOCIATION lobby correspondent]

[Excerpts] Britain must retain the bomb, the prime minister declared tonight. Mrs Thatcher used the language of the cold war to reaffirm her hardline commitment to keeping nuclear weapons in British hands. Without a nuclear deterrent, Soviet leader Mr Mikhail Gorbachev could "threaten" Western Europe. Soviet superiority in conventional and chemical weapons would guarantee that "he would get what he wanted", she said bluntly.

Her remarks were made in an interview on ITN's news at ten.

Her comments on disarmament were notable for their ferocity, and for the extent to which they portrayed the Soviet Union as a threat.

Mrs Thatcher said: "I want a war-free Europe. A nuclear-free Europe I do not believe would be a war-free Europe.

"Of course Mr Gorbachev wants to get rid of nuclear weapons out of Western Europe. Because he knows if he does, the enormous superiority he has got in men, in tanks, in aircraft, in all conventional weapons, and the colossal superiority in chemical weapons would mean that if he got the nuclear weapon out of Europe, we would never be able to deter an aggressor."

Mrs Thatcher continued: "He could almost threaten, and he would get what he wanted. It's my job, as head of government, to see that no one who wants to threaten Western Europe has any chance of succeeding.

"The only way to do that is to see that we have a sure defence.

"You are not sure because of your virtue. You are sure because the men, the materials, the weapons, including the nuclear, are there."

Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief Soviet foreign affairs spokesman, was asked by interviewer Peter Sissons whether he accepted Mrs Thatcher's view that the British independent nuclear [as received] was vital to our security.

"No, I don't accept this because we want to see the world nuclear-free and we cannot see it nuclear-free if Britain is going to keep her nuclear forces.

"We have the plan to free the world from nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The Americans also want to get rid of nuclear weapons, at least President Reagan said many times that he wants to see the world nuclear-free. So we have this in common.

"We are believers, you are non-believers. You do not believe in a nuclear-free world. So our task is to convert you to our faith."